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Despite the explosive growth in the number of people receiving disability benefits in South Africa, very 
little is known about the labour supply effects of the disability grant (DG). This study investigates the 
impact of disability grant receipt on labour force participation. Consideration is given to potential bias 
that may arise from unobserved confounding factors. The study utilises data drawn from the 2007 
wave of the General Household Survey (GHS) and implements a three-step methodology in a 
comparative perspective. Firstly, a standard probit regression of labour force participation is applied, 
followed by an instrumental variable regression to correct for possible endogeneity of DG take up. 
Finally, the sensitivity and robustness of the results is checked by implementing a variety of 
propensity score matching techniques. The results overall suggest that the DG receipt has substantial 
work disincentive effects, but the magnitude of the effect differs between parametric and non-
parametric estimators. 
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Globally, governments and development agencies tentatively recognise cash transfer programmes as 
an important instrument to counter insecurity and vulnerability associated with extended durations of 
absolute poverty among the underprivileged. The popularity of such programmes stems from their 
inherent flexibility in targeting specific individual and households’ varied needs. In line with that 
recognition, South Africa, for a developing country, has one of the most substantive social protection 
systems (Seekings, 2007). Disadvantaged children and their families can benefit from the Child 
Support Grant (CSG), Care Dependency Grant (CDG) and Foster Care Grant (FCG). Elderly people, 
war veterans and people with disabilities can benefit from the Old Age Pension (OAP), War Veterans 
Grant (WVG) and the Disability Grant (DG) respectively. All social grants in South Africa are 
administered by the South African Social Security Agency (SASSA). 
 
The coverage and uptake of social grants in South Africa has grown tremendously in the past decade. 
In particular, between 2001 and 2007, the number of people receiving disability benefits more than 
doubled. A total of 0.6 million individuals received the DG in 2001, increasing to an unprecedented 
level of 1.4 million beneficiaries by 2007. This represents an average annual growth rate of 15.2 
percent, five times more than the 3.1 percent average annual growth rate observed for the OAP over 
the same period. Similarly, the FCG increased at an average annual growth rate of 26.2 percent, 
although, in comparison to the the OAP, DGP and CSG, it has a low coverage. The CSG had the 
highest increase in coverage, growing at an average annual rate of 138.3 percent (SASSA, 2007). In 
view of these trends, it is unsurprising that almost a third (29.2 percent) of the South African 
population (50.6 million) benefit from social grants. Relatedly, 52.3 percent of the country’s 
households have at least one person receiving a social grant (SASSA, 2010).  
 
A growing body of evidence has demonstrated the positive contribution of social grants to poverty 
alleviation (Leibbrandt, Woolard, Finn and Argent, 2010; Booysen and van der Berg, 2005; Case and 
Deaton, 1998). In particular, a number of studies have found that the OAP is an important source of 
income for the poor and elderly, and in some instances is linked to increased school attendance, and 
reduction in child labour (Case and Ardington, 2006; Edmonds, Mammen and Miller, 2005; Hamoudi 
and Thomas, 2005). Yet another strand of literature has identified positive effects of social grants on 
health outcomes of beneficiaries and other household members (Aguero, Carter and Woolard, 2007; 
Case, 2004; Duflo, 2000). These studies clearly support the case that access to social grants (OAP 
and CSG) alleviates household poverty, improves health status of household members by improving 
nutrition access and health care of household members, and improves human capital outcomes of 
children in recipient households. 
 
Nonetheless, social grants do not always have the intended positive effects; diverse behavioural 
effects have been associated with South Africa’s generous social security system (Swartz and 
Schneider, 2006). Accordingly, policy-makers face a critical challenge of designing social security 
policies that achieve poverty alleviation with limited collateral costs. However, on a practical level, 
programmes that usually have positive outcomes on one dimension, often have impairing effects on 
the other. For example, other than the positive effects of the social grants identified above, concerns 
have been raised about possible promotion of a welfare dependency syndrome – a state where 
beneficiaries become permanently dependent on ‘handouts’ and lose any inclination to improve their 
circumstances and come out of poverty through their own efforts (Devereux, 2010; Thornton, 2008). 
The role of social grants on labour force participation (LFP) has thus attracted wide interest both 
locally and internationally. 
  
Two competing perspectives have emerged regarding the role of social grants on labour supply. On 
the one hand, a number of studies have demonstrated that social security transfers have substantial 
work disincentive effects (Ranchhod, 2009; Mitra, 2009; Booysen and van der Berg, 2005; Dinkelman, 
2004; Bertrand, Mullainathan and Miller, 2003). It is proposed that cash transfers constitute an 
injection of non-labour income into the household, and as such have an income effect on both direct 
and indirect beneficiaries in the household, which may reduce work incentives (Woolard and 
Leibbrandt, 2010). This has led some to argue that the ‘state needs to carefully consider the 
incentives it provides under its various welfare programmes’ (Ranchhod, 2006a). An alternative view 
regards social grants as having positive employment effects (Ardington, Case and Hosegood, 2009; 
Posel, Fairburn and Lund, 2006; Klasen and Woolard, 2009). In particular, evidence on the CSG has 
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shown that cash transfers provide money that can be used to pay for transport costs when searching 
for jobs, and thus may result in increased labour force participation (Eyal and Woolard, 2010). 
 
In continental Europe and the United States, the declining labour force participation rates (LFPRs) 
observed among the elderly has attracted a substantial amount of research attempting to investigate 
the interaction between social insurance programmes and LFP (Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008; 
Campolieti, 2004; Gruber, 2000; Bound and Burkhauser, 1999). One body of literature identified 
generous and long lasting unemployment benefits as factors that potentially explain the low LFPRs 
(Blanchard and Wolfers, 2000). Disability insurance (DI) programmes have been suggested as 
potential vehicles altering labour market behaviour (Staubli, 2009; Autor and Duggan, 2006; Haveman 
and Wolfe, 1984b). 
 
In South Africa, unlike the OAP and CSG whose reach and impact has been the subject of a growing 
body of literature (Ranchhod, 2009; Ardington et al., 2009; Aguero et al., 2007; Lund, 2007; Case and 
Ardington, 2006; Ranchhod, 2006b; Booysen and van der Berg, 2005; Case, 2004; Duflo, 2000), very 
little is known about the labour supply effect of the DGP which specifically targets working age 
persons with disabilities. This is in part because of a paucity of disability related data, but most 
importantly the disincentive effect of disability cash transfers has long been assumed to be 
economically insignificant because of low take-up rates and high unemployment in the country (Case 
and Deaton, 1998). Indeed, in some countries take-up rates of disability cash transfer programmes is 
very low (O.Keefe, 2007). However, in the last decade, the take-up rate of the DG in South Africa has 
grown substantially and 4.5 percent of the working age population (8.3 percent of the labour force) 
were receiving the DG by 2007 as shown in Figure 1 (National Treasury, 2007). 
 
Figure 1: Proportion of the working population and labour force receiving the disability grant 
 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on the GHS, 2002-2010. 
 
If screening of applicants to the disability grant programme (DGP) was consistently in line with 
legislation, receipt of disability benefits would not affect the decision to participate in the labour 
market, as only those who are unable to work due to disabilities would receive the DG benefits. 
Nonetheless, because the selection process is imperfect and developing countries generally lack the 
administrative capacity required to run social programmes, moral hazard reporting is expected to take 
place (Parsons, 1996). As a result, disability assessment is inherently prone to classification errors 
(Mitra, 2009) with some individuals receiving disability benefits even though they are not disabled 
(inclusion error), while others may be rejected although they have disabilities (exclusion error) 
(Benitez-Silva, Buchinsky and Rust, 2004; Nagi, 1969). 
 




Due to errors in disability screening, it is not unusual that in developing countries with high under-
employment and unemployment, disability targeted programmes might induce efficiency losses 
through reductions in labour supply. In light of the generosity of potential benefits under the DGP and 
concurrent low levels of LFP observed among people with disabilities, the DG provides a potentially 
interesting explanation of the low LFPRs among people with disabilities in South Africa.  
 
This paper aims to investigate the effect of the DGP on labour supply decisions among South Africans 
receiving DGs. The impact of the DG on LFP is estimated using a three-step methodological 
technique. Firstly, a standard probit is implemented to control for observables. Secondly, a probit 
instrumental variable (IV) regression is applied to address potential endogeneity of DG take-up. 
Finally, as the instrument might be weak, an attempt is made to control for the endogeneity of 
participation in the DGP with a propensity score matching (PSM) method to check the robustness of 
probit and probit IV results.  
 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows follows. Section 2 discusses trends in LFP in South 
Africa, and how these trends differ according to disability and DG status. Section 3 reviews previous 
evidence on the effect of disability benefits and LFP, while Section 4 describes the data used for 
empirical analyses. The modelling strategies will be considered in Section 5. Section 6 presents the 
results of implementing probit and probit IV regression techniques, while Section 7 tests the 
robustness of the results using a propensity score matching methodology. Lastly, Section 8 concludes 
with a discussion of the policy implications of the findings. 
 
2. LABOUR MARKET OVERVIEW 
 
Over the past decade, more men and women have been entering the labour market, thereby 
increasing the share of the economically active population (Casale and Posel, 2002). In particular, the 
increasing number of women entering the labour market has attracted a considerable amount of 
literature on the feminisation of the labour market (Klasen and Woolard, 1999; Standing, Sender and 
Weeks, 1996). Despite the documented increase in labour force participation among South Africans, 
the labour force participation rates (LFPRs) of people with disabilities have remained substantially 
lower than the national average. This is particularly true of those receiving disability benefits.  
 
For the purposes of this paper, LFPR is defined as the percentage of the working-age population 
reporting to be either working or actively looking for work. The numerator thus consists of the 
economically active population employed or unemployed and looking for work, whilst the denominator 
consists of the total population within the working age category. The minimum working-age limit 
differs from country to country and is usually guided by legislation that regulates for example, the 
compulsory schooling age, minimum age for admission to employment, and extent of child labour 
(Hussmanns, 2007). In most countries, including South Africa, the 15-65 age group constitutes the 
working age population. 
 
The working age population increased steadily during the years 2002 through 2007 (Table 1). By 
2007, the country had a total of 30.4 million individuals within the working ages of 15 to 64 years. 
Similarly, employment steadily increased over the same period to reach 13.3 million, representing an 
absorption rate of 43.7 percent. The trends in unemployment appear to reflect the general patterns 
observed in employment. Narrow unemployment declined moderately to reach 3.9 million individuals 
by 2007, representing an unemployment rate of 22.7 percent. For the greater part of the period, the 
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Table 1: Labour market overview, 2002-2007 
 
 
2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 
Labour Market Aggregates (Millions) 
Working Age Population 28.5 28.9 29.3 29.7 30 30.4 
Employed 11.3 11.4 11.6 12.3 12.8 13.3 
Narrow Unemployed 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.5 4.4 3.9 
Narrow Labour Force 16.2 15.9 15.8 16.8 17.2 17.2 
Broad Unemployed 8 8.2 8 7.8 7.6 7.3 
Broad Labour Force 19.3 19.6 19.6 20.1 20.4 20.6 
Discouraged Workseekers 3.1 3.8 3.9 3.3 3.2 3.4 
LFP Rate (Percent) 
Narrow LFPR 56.9 54.8 53.8 56.5 57.3 56.6 
Broad LFPR 67.7 67.8 66.9 67.7 68.8 67.8 
Unemployment Rate (Percent) 
      Narrow Unemployment 30.4 28 26.2 26.7 25.5 22.7 
Broad Unemployment 41.5 41.8 40.8 38.8 37.3 35.4 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2002-2007. 
 
Figure 2 shows the LFPRs among South Africans in general, people with disabilities, DG recipients 
and non-recipients. The LFPRs con.rm the presence of substantial differences between the general 
working age population and people with disabilities.  
 
Figure 2: Labour force participation rates by disability status, 2002-2007 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2002-2007. 
 
It appears the general working age population have substantially higher LFPRs compared to people 
with disabilities. While 56 percent of the general population participate in the labour market, only one 
in four (25 percent) of people with disabilities do so. Additionally, there is striking variation in LFPRs 
among people with disabilities: DG recipients have lower LFPRs compared to non-recipients. The 
differences are statistically significant as shown in Figure 3. 





Figure 3: Trends in labour force participation rates by disability status, 2002-2007 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2002-2007. 
 
2.1 Prevalence of Inclusion and Exclusion Errors in DG Targeting 
 
The key question is whether the low LFPRs observed among recipients of disability benefits primarily 
reflect health status; that is, the tendency for people with disabilities to withdraw from the labour 
market due to physical impairments, or a longer lasting structural influence emanating from altered 
work seeking behaviour due to increased reservation wages. The answer to this question draws on 
the LFPRs of individuals incorrectly receiving disability benefits and those erroneously excluded from 
the DGP. If the low LFPR among people with disabilities is driven by health reasons, individuals 
erroneously excluded from the DGP should exhibit similar LFPRs as recipients of the DG. Similarly, 
individuals incorrectly included in the DGP should have similar LFPRs as the rest of the general 
working age population. If, instead, the opposite is true for either case, the DG may be a significant 
influence on the withdrawal of people with disabilities from the labour market.  
 
The DG explicitly targets people whose disability severely prevents them from being gainfully 
employed. The grant is, therefore, an explicitly targeted cash transfer, as opposed to a universal 
transfer where everyone within a category – such as children or the elderly – is eligible. The main 
benefit of targeting the beneficiaries is that it potentially saves money by reducing the “inclusion error” 
of universal programmes – the distribution of transfers to people who are not eligible, and eliminating 
"exclusion errors". The later have an effect of depriving severely disabled people of a source of social 
investment that can trap generations in poverty, with a social cost many times the unutilised fiscal 
expenditure.  
 
Inclusion error in the DG case is, thus, the mistake of providing the social transfer to someone who 
either doesn’t have a disability or has a disability that is not severe enough to prevent the person from 
being gainfully employed. Exclusion error, on the other hand, is the failure to provide a transfer to a 
targeted individual that has work limiting disability. The reduction of inclusion error is the potential 
benefit of targeting; exclusion error is part of the cost. For the purposes of this thesis, inclusion and 
exclusion errors have been limited to the GHS question that explores if a respondent has a disability. 
Therefore, the estimates of inclusion and exclusion based on this judgement at the minimum may 
overstate the prevalence of exclusion errors as only a proper medical assessment can potentially 
determine one’s work capabilities. However, we would expect inclusion errors determined using the 
GHS method to be fairly close to the ideal estimates.  
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Figure 4 presents the LFPRs for individuals who are incorrectly benefiting from the DGP and those 
erroneously excluded from the programme. The estimates, indeed, confirm the influence of the DG on 
LFP as the incorrectly included recipients have similar LFPRs to people with work disabilities 
(legitimate beneficiaries), whilst the exclusion errors have higher LFPRs than DG recipients. However, 
this evidence is only tentative; an empirical analysis is required to confirm or refute this supposition. 
 
Figure 4: Labour force participation rates of individuals incorrectly on DGP and erroneously 
off DGP, 2003-2007 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2002-2007. 
 




The link between the DG and LFP is complex. Any analysis of the two should investigate whether or 
not receipt of the DG by individuals acts as a disincentive to seeking or keeping employment. The 
means test that determines eligibility to the DGP seems to penalise and de-motivate people with 
private savings, or those who want to take-up employment. People with disabilities are more likely to 
rely on the DG because of their exclusion from employment opportunities (Boardman, Grove, Perkins 
and Shepherd, 2003; Manning and White, 1995). Those who are employed are likely to be so on a 
temporary basis and are less well paid than able bodied individuals (DeLeire, 2000; Burkhauser and 
Daly, 1996). As a result, they often weigh the risk of losing their jobs against an otherwise guaranteed 
source of income through the DG (Tschopp, Perkins, Hart-Katuin, Born and Holt, 2007; McLaren, 
Philpott, Mdunyelwa and Peter, 2003). They argue that in the event that they are laid off from their 
jobs, they risk facing long delays before they start receiving government benefits again (Mitra, 2005). 
 
3.1.1 Potential Causal Mechanisms  
 
Reservation Wage: In the standard labour-leisure choice model, the reservation wage is a 
fundamental aspect of the decision on whether to work or not. The reservation wage is the amount an 
individual would need to earn at work in order to accept a job. For a DG beneficiary to return to work, 
the market wage would need to exceed the reservation wage. If leisure is assumed to be a normal 
good in the labour leisure choice model, the reservation wage increases as non-labour income 
increases (Borjas, 2000). As the disability benefits increase, non-labour income also increases, and 
ultimately workers want to consume more leisure and therefore a larger wage is required to induce 
the person to work (Bloemen and Stancanelli, 2001; Gorter and Gorter, 1993; Jones, 1988; Feldstein 
and Poterba, 1984).  





Health Effect: The decision not to work by DG beneficiaries may not be completely explained by the 
reservation wage effect. Even in the presence of classification errors, the likelihood of receiving 
disability benefits is high among individuals with severe disabilities (diminished health stocks). At the 
same time, individuals with severe disabilities have a higher probability of not engaging in market 
activities. Therefore, the decision not to work in such circumstances may be a result of poor health 
rather than a preference for leisure (Kreider and Pepper, 2007; O.Donnell, 1998; Barnes, 1992).  
 
3.2 International Evidence 
 
While the OAP and CSG have been carefully researched, very little evidence is available on the DGP 
(Mitra, 2005; Mitra, 2009). Most of the research on disability benefits and labour market outcomes 
relates to the industrialised world where poverty and unemployment are more limited and the social 
security system more expansive than in South Africa (Surender, Noble, Wright and Ntshongwana, 
2010). This section presents international evidence on the effect of disability benefits and labour 
supply. The generalisability of the findings to the South African case is however still to be determined. 
 
Since the 1960s, the LFPRs of the elderly males in OECD countries has declined from 80 to 65 
percent despite improvements in aggregate health (Staubli, 2009). This created an interest from 
researchers seeking to explain what seemed like an appalling phenomenon. For this reason, currently 
there is a substantial amount of literature focusing on the behavioural effects of disability insurance 
programmes as a possible explanation of the declining LFPRs (Gruber, 2000; Bound, 1989; Haveman 
andWolfe, 1984a; Parsons, 1980). Although there is ample literature on social security programmes 
and labour supply in the developed world, particularly the US and Canada1, there still remains 
substantial uncertainty on the impact of the programmes. 
 
Studies on behavioural effects of disability programmes may be categorised into two groups. On the 
one hand, there are studies that rely on time series variations in the legislation to identify the effect of 
changes in benefits or other parameters of the social security programmes. Alternatively, studies rely 
on cross sectional variations (e.g. across families) in benefits to identify the effect of social security 
benefits. Further, there are studies that utilize panel data potentially drawing on both time series and 
cross-sectional variation in benefits. 
 
Behavioural cross sectional analyses suffer from the likely correlation of factors that determine 
benefits (e.g. previous earnings) with labour force attachment and thus confound the estimated 
effects of the disability insurance programme. On the other hand, studies which utilize time series 
analyses encounter a situation where LFP trends downward when social security benefits trend up. 
The causal pathway is thus affected by whether the negative relationship between benefits and labour 
supply is causal or is just a reflection of other variables that have also trended over time such as 
income or pension wealth (Krueger and Pischke, 1991). 
  
Cross-sectional studies generally proceed by modeling LFP as a function of potential disability 
benefits receipt. The pioneering study in this block was by Parsons (1980) who estimated an elasticity 
of labour force non-participation with respect to disability benefits. With a coeffcient range of 0:4 to 
0.93, his upper bound estimate implied that increases in disability benefits over the 1960s and 1970s 
could explain the entire trend of non-participation. 
 
However, Bound (1989) argued that this type of strategy is likely to yield misleading inferences of the 
effect of DI generosity on LFP. Since DI benefits are a redistributive function of past earnings 
common to all workers, variation in potential benefits arises primarily from differences in earnings 
history across workers. This leads to a fundamental identification problem in modeling the effect of 
potential DI benefits on work decisions; a finding that workers with higher potential DI replacement 
rates are more likely to leave their jobs may simply refiect the fact that low earning workers have less 
desire to continue working. What is clearly needed is to identify the behavioural impact of DI benefits 
variation on programme generosity, which is independent of underlying tastes for work. Haveman and 
Wolfe (1984b) attempted to address this identification problem by replacing the actual replacement 
rate with a predicted value obtained from a first stage regression of the replacement rate on a set of 
exogenous variables. In contrast to the earlier studies, they found much lower elasticity estimates of 
                                                   
1 Bound and Burkhauser (1999) provide a comprehensive review up to the year 1999. 
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between 0 and 0.03. To identify the replacement rate effect (or the separate wage and disability 
benefit effects) some exogenous variables that determine wages or (and) disability benefits must be 
excluded from the LFP equation. However, without a convincing justiication for their exclusion 
restrictions, their estimates may not be credible. 
 
While these earlier cross-sectional studies based on US data either ignored the potential endogeneity 
of the replacement rate or relied on arbitrary exclusion restrictions for identification, two recent studies 
explore alternative identification approaches for dealing with the endogeneity of disability benefit 
receipt (Autor and Duggan, 2003; Gruber, 2000). Gruber (2000) employed a difference-in-difference 
methodology to exploit an exogenous policy change conducted in Canada in 1987, where the benefit 
levels of the rest of the country were adjusted upwards to meet those of the Quebec Province. Using 
data from 1985-1989 period, he estimated the elasticity of labour force non-participation with respect 
to DI benefit levels to be between 0.28 and 0.36. The identification approach and the credibility of his 
estimate depend on the validity of the assumption that any changes in the relative labour market 
conditions in Quebec as compared to the rest of the country during this period, were uncorrelated with 
the differential change in DI benefits.  
 
Autor and Duggan (2003) also use differential time variation in average benefits across geographical 
regions to identify the impact of DI on the LFP of low skilled workers in the US. Using state level data 
from the Current Population Survey (CPS) and the Social Security Administration (SSA), they 
exploited the variation in the replacement rate due to differences across states and over time in the 
wage distribution, to identify the effect on low-income workers. They maintained that the widening 
dispersion of earnings in the US, combined with the progressivity of the disability benefits formula and 
the fact that DI benefits are set nationally and do not adjust for variation in regional wage levels, 
provide an exogenous measure of programme generosity independent of workers’ underlying taste for 
work. They concluded that the DI system provided many low-skilled workers with a viable alternative 
to unemployment. They estimated that the overall unemployment rate in 1998 would have been one 
half a percentage point higher in the absence of the DI programme. Unfortunately, their reported 
estimates do not allow calculation of an elasticity that can be compared to those in other studies. The 
identification strategy relies on the absence of other differences across states in both the changes in 
labour market conditions over time as well as the impact of such changes on labour supply, which 
seems problematic since variation in the wage distribution over time across states can itself be 
expected to directly affect labour supply. 
 
While most literature has focused on the effect of potential benefits on labour supply, there are a 
number of other tools available to the DI policy maker who is trying to mitigate moral hazard. Marvel 
(1982), Halpern and Hausman (1986), Parsons (1991) and Gruber and Kubik (1997) examined the 
effect of the DI denial rate on applications to DI on labour force participation. Halpern and Hausman 
(1986), and Parsons (1991) found a strong association between denial rates and LFP. Gruber and 
Kubik also found a strong association between denial rates and the labour force participation of older 
workers; they estimated that each 10 percentage rise in denial rates led to a statistically significant 2.8 
percent fall in LFP among 45-64 year old males. 
 
De Jong, Lindeboom and van der Klaauw (2006) investigated the effects of intensified screening of 
disability insurance benefit applications. A large-scale experiment was set up where in two of the 26 
Dutch regions, workers of the disability insurance administration were instructed to intensely screen 
applications. The empirical results showed that intense screening reduces long-term absenteeism as 
a result of ill health and disability insurance applications. This provides evidence both for direct effects 
of the more intensive screening on work resumption during sickness absenteeism and for self-
screening by potential disability insurance applicants. 
 
Staubli (2009) explored the labour supply effects of a large-scale policy change in the Austrian 
disability insurance programme, which tightened eligibility criteria for older men. Using administrative 
data on Austrian private-sector employees, the results of a difference- in-difference empirical strategy 
suggested a substantial and statistically significant decline in disability enrolment of between 11.6 and 
14.3 percentage points and a modest increase in employment of 3.2 to 4 percentage points. 
 
  




4. DATA AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 
The data used in this thesis comes from the GHS, conducted by Statistics South Africa - the official 
statistical agency in South Africa. The GHS is a nationally representative large-scale cross-sectional 
survey. For each round, the survey samples 10 households from each of the 3000 Enumerating Areas 
(EAs), giving an average sample size of 30 000 South African households across all nine provinces of 
the country. The first GHS was released in 2002, and subsequent surveys have been conducted 
annually. The survey provides a comprehensive picture of social grants coverage, labour market and 
general living conditions in the country.  
 





As this paper aims to assess the labour supply impact of receiving the DG, the dependent variable is 
a dummy variable on LFP. The dummy is coded 1 if an individual participates in the labour market 
and 0 if otherwise. Given the dichotomous nature of the variable, it is assumed that an individual 
faces the choice between participating in the labour market or not. 
 
The key regressor is receipt of DG benefits. In order to construct this variable, a dummy variable for 
disability is created first. An individual is coded as having a disability if the response to the question, 
“Do you have a limitation in daily activities, at home, at work or at school, because of a long term 
physical, sensory, hearing, intellectual, or psychological condition, lasting six months or more?” is 
affirmative. This self-reported measure, though widely used, is likely to suffr from endogeneity (arising 
from measurement error), especially when used to model the effect of own disability on labour supply 
(Bound, 1991). Of the individuals who report having disabilities, another dummy variable is further 
created with code 1 if the individual receives the DG and 0 if otherwise. This becomes our treatment 
variable in subsequent analyses. 
 
The potential labour market participants are assumed to make decisions based on their individual 
characteristics. Thus, other explanatory variables such as race, age, educational attainment, marital 
status and type of disability is included at the individual level. Household characteristics are controlled 
for in the LFP equation by variables such as the presence of infants, children aged 1-7 years, and 
children aged 8-15 years in the household. Similarly, the presence of a pensioner in the household is 
also controlled for as part of household effects. Community variations in employment opportunities 
are proxied by provincial dummies, district narrow unemployment and LFPRs. 
 
Table 2 provides the characteristics of the ultimate sample presented according to the treatment 
status. A total of 3 293 individuals reported to have disabilities, of which 1 675 individuals (42,7 
percent) receive disability benefits. The racial structure of people with disabilities is moderately similar 
between the treated and control cases. Both are dominated by Africans with a share of over 77 
percent. The major difference within the race category occurs among Coloureds. It appears 
individuals within this racial group are more represented in treated cases than in the control group. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics of selected variables used in estimations 
     Treated Control Difference 
     N=1675 N=2248   
Variable     Mean (SD) Mean (SD) (T-C) p-value 
LFP Status 
Employed 0.04 (0.20) 0.13 (0.33) -0.08 0.000 
Narrow unemployed 0.01 (0.12) 0.04 (0.20) -0.03 0.000 
Broad unemployed 0.02 (0.13) 0.06 (0.24) -0.03 0.000 
Narrow labour force 0.06 (0.23) 0.17 (0.37) -0.11 0.000 
Broad labour force 0.06 (0.24) 0.19 (0.39) -0.13 0.000 
Race 
African 0.77 (0.42) 0.79 (0.40) -0.02 0.039 
Coloured 0.18 (0.39) 0.13 (0.34) 0.05 0.000 
Asian 0.02 (0.12) 0.02 (0.13) 0.00 0.659 
White 0.03 (0.18) 0.05 (0.23) -0.02 0.001 
Age groups 
Age 42.08 (27.50) 49.87 (55.01) -7.79 0.000 
85-24 years 0.10 (0.29) 0.17 (0.37) -0.07 0.000 
25-34 years 0.18 (0.38) 0.19 (0.40) 0.01 0.247 
35-44 years 0.25 (0.44) 0.23 (0.42) 0.02 0.212 
45-54 years 0.31 (0.46) 0.25 (0.43) 0.06 0.001 
55-60 years 0.17 (0.37) 0.16 (0.36) 0.01 0.600 
Marital status 
Single 0.57 (0.49) 0.46 (0.50) 0.11 0.000 
Married 0.23 (0.42) 0.26 (0.44) -0.03 0.053 
Cohabit 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 (0.23) 0.01 0.038 
Widowed 0.08 (0.28) 0.19 (0.39) -0.11 0.000 
Divorced 0.04 (0.20) 0.04 (0.19) 0.00 0.560 
Educational Attainment 
Years of Education 4.78 (4.17) 4.72 (4.31) 0.06 0.630 
No Education 0.30 (0.46) 0.31 (0.46) -0.01 0.657 
Primary 0.47 (0.50) 0.47 (0.50) 0.00 0.862 
Secondary 0.16 (0.37) 0.13 (0.34) 0.03 0.004 
Matric 0.05 (0.23) 0.06 (0.23) -0.01 0.942 
Diploma 0.01 (0.07) 0.02 (0.15) -0.01 0.000 
Degree 0.00 (0.05) 0.01 (0.09) -0.01 0.021 
Literacy 
Can read 0.60 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) 0.04 0.021 
Can write 0.59 (0.49) 0.56 (0.50) 0.03 0.043 
Province 
Gauteng 0.04 (0.21) 0.08 (0.27) -0.04 0.000 
Eastern Cape 0.18 (0.38) 0.13 (0.34) 0.05 0.000 
Northern Cape 0.07 (0.26) 0.09 (0.28) -0.02 0.172 
Free State 0.09 (0.28) 0.09 (0.29) 0.00 0.466 
KwaZulu Natal 0.26 (0.44) 0.25 (0.43) 0.01 0.655 
North West 0.09 (0.29) 0.12 (0.33) -0.03 0.006 
Western Cape 0.12 (0.32) 0.08 (0.27) 0.04 0.000 
Mpumalanga 0.07 (0.26) 0.10 (0.30) -0.03 0.005 
Limpopo 0.08 (0.27) 0.07 (0.25) 0.01 0.103 
Child Status 
No children 0.33 (0.47) 0.34 (0.47) -0.01 0.732 
Infants present 0.08 (0.28) 0.08 (0.27) 0.00 0.806 
Children 1-8 yrs present 0.38 (0.49) 0.39 (0.49) -0.01 0.628 
Children 8-15 yrs present 0.20 (0.40) 0.19 (0.39) 0.01 0.406 
Old Aged Adults 
Over 60 year old present 0.34 (0.47) 0.51 (0.50) -0.17 0.000 
Local labour market conditions 
District unemployment rate 0.25 (0.09) 0.25 (0.08) 0.00 0.216 
District narrow LFP 0.52 (0.11) 0.52 (0.11) 0.00 0.382 
Impairment 
Physical 0.49 (0.50) 0.39 (0.49) 0.10 0.000 
Sight 0.07 (0.26) 0.22 (0.42) -0.15 0.000 
Hearing 0.05 (0.22) 0.17 (0.38) -0.12 0.000 
Speech 0.04 (0.20) 0.03 (0.16) 0.01 0.005 
Mental 0.21 (0.41) 0.12 (0.32) 0.09 0.000 
Emotional 0.13 (0.34) 0.07 (0.26) 0.06 0.000 
Distance to welfare office 
Less than 30 min 0.89 (0.45) 0.89 (0.47) 0.00 0.775 
More than 30 min 0.11 (0.39) 0.11 (0.40) 0.00 0.875 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Note:  Standard deviations (SD) are shown in paranthesis. 
 
On average individuals in the treatment group are 42 years old with 4.8 years of schooling, whilst 
individuals in the control group are 50 years old with 4.7 years of schooling. The key difference within 




the age structure occurs among individuals aged between 18 and 24 years: treated individuals are 
less likely to be in this age group compared with individuals in the control group. Pensioners are more 
represented in control households than in treated households, whilst individuals with physical 
disability are more prevalent in the treated group compared with the control group. There are no 
substantial differences between the treated and control groups with regards to educational attainment, 
provincial dummies, presence of children, local labour market conditions, and distance to the nearest 
welfare office. The table thus highlights the role of randomization: it appears the distribution of 
covariates between treated and control groups is overall not significantly different. 
 
5. MODELLING STRATEGY 
 
5.1 Theoretical Model: Static Model of Labour Supply 
 
The labour supply effect of DG receipts can be modelled through a static model. Following the works 
of Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004), Kaufman and Hotchkiss (2000) , Ehrenberg and Smith (2000) and 
Killingsworth (1983), consideration is given to a representative individual between the working ages of 
18-60 years who reports having a disability. The individual is faced with a choice to allocate time 
between market and non-market activities. Each choice stems from the inherent intention of the 
individual to maximise an independent utility function composed of consumption and leisure. The 
utility is maximised subject to a budget constraint (Blundell and Macurdy, 1999; Leuthold, 1968). 
Therefore, let h and C denote the individual’s hours of work and private consumption respectively. 
The price of the consumption is considered to be a numaraire. The individual’s utility is thus  
 
U = f (1 – h,C)            (1) 
 
where U is strongly quasi-concave, strictly monotone (increasing) and twice continuously 
differentiable. Also, let w and y be the individual’s wage income and non-labour income respectively. 
In seeking to maximise utility, the individual is constrained by an income level required to purchase 
consumption and by implication leisure time, thus: 
 
C = wh + y            (2) 
 
The individual choice problem is thus: 
 





wh + y = C            (4) 
 
5.1.1 Including the Disability Grant 
 
The above framework models an individual’s LFP and hours of work, h, as a function of individual 
preferences, unearned income y and potential wage w. Labour force participation depends on 
whether the potential wage exceeds the individual’s reservation wage (Kaufman and Hotchkiss, 
2000). The potential wage is a function of human capital, and traits such as age, race, education and 
local labour market conditions. On the other hand, the reservation wage reflects the valuation of an 
individual’s non-market time, and depends on factors such as individual’s disability (health) status D, 
taste for leisure and unearned income y. Unearned income is composed of the individual’s income net 
of any earnings w. Thus, an individual’s LFP, h, is ultimately a function of unearned income y, 
disability status H, and other socio-economic characteristics that affect the reservation wage and 
potential age w: 
 
h = f (y, D, w)            (5) 
 
The individual disability status (D) has two implications; the health effect (H) discussed earlier and 
potential transfer payment component (DG). Therefore unearned income y, is a function of the DG 
and other socio-economic factors x:  
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h = f (g (DG, x) ,H ,w)           (7) 
 
Substituting (7) in (3) gives 
 




w [f (g (DG, x) ,H ,w] + g (DG, x) = C         (9) 
 
The solution to the above model clearly suggests that the DGP affects labour participation through the 
health effect (H) and pure-income effect (DG). However, it is impossible to adequately separate the 
two effects into standalone components in an empirical framework. The various types of disability are 
included in the empirical analyses to control for the health effect. It is assumed that each type of 
disability represents a different individual health state. For example, an individual with a physical 
disability is accordingly expected to have a different probability of performing market activities 
compared with an individual with a hearing disability. 
 
5.2 Empirical Models 
 
5.3 The Probit Common Effect Model 
 
Until recently, the standard way to estimate the effect of treatment on labour market outcomes with 
cross sectional data was to control for observable differences between treated and non-treated 
individuals using ordinary least squares (OLS) linear regression (Vandenberghe and Robin, 2004). 
The standard probit model is similar to OLS regression except that it is applied to a categorical 
dependent variable as opposed to a continuous variable. Consistent with this approach, let Yi be the 
probability of LFP (outcome measure), and Di be the treatment indicator, where Di = 1 if an individual 
with a disability receives the DG and Di = 0 if an individual with a disability does not receive the DG. 
The observed LFP outcome is, therefore, estimated using the following standard probit regression: 
 
Yi = α + βXi  +    Di + εi           (10) 
 
Where Yi  is the probability of LFP (= 1 if an individual participates in the labour market and 0 if not), Xi  
is a vector of control variables at the individual, household and community levels and εi is the error 
term proxying unobservables that affect LFP. 
 
The variable Xi  is a vector of demographic and socio-economic covariates that affect the likelihood of 
participating in the labour market. It therefore includes variables such as age, race, educational 
attainment, household composition, marital status, gender, and local labour market conditions. In this 
base model or the “benchmark” case, the treatment dummy gives the coefficient _  for the average 
effect of DG on the probability of LFP of the recipients (ATT). If the regressors included in the vector 
Xi  perfectly control for the determinants of participating in the labour market (individual characteristics 
and other factors), the probit estimate,     yields an unbiased estimate of ATT. This approach assumes 
that there is no correlation between the DG take-up and unobservable factors that affect LFP. 
 
5.4  Instrumental Variable (IV) Two-Stage Least Squares Regression 
 
The assumption of no correlation between DG take-up and unobservable factors is unfortunately too 
strong, especially in relation to issues of disability as the possibility of of endogenous participation in 
the DGP is of concern. There may be systematic differences between DG recipients and non-
recipients. Such a possibility yields a biased probit coefficient of the ATT. Specifically, enrolment is 
likely to be higher among individuals with severe disabilities, a possibility that simultaneously deters 
their participation in the labour market. Therefore, the coefficient associated with DG dummy may be 
confounded with the effect of the unobserved (selection) variables. Controlling for the type of disability 




in (10) may potentially reduce the bias, but not completely remove the confounding effect. It is, 
therefore, important to control for the adverse selection problem, thus reducing the distortion on the 
labour supply impact of the DGP.  
 
To fix this problem an instrument for DG receipt is required. To this end, an instrumental variable (IV) 
estimation strategy is implemented. Theoretically, this strategy consists of estimating a two-stage 
regression model. In the first stage, the treatment outcome (probability of receiving disability benefits) 
is estimated against all the exogenous variables, Xi  and the instrument Z. The instrument introduces 
an element of randomness into assignment to treatment and ultimately: 
 
Di  = α + λXi  + ƬZ + ηi           (11) 
 
The predicted cDi from (11) is added to the regression of  
 
Yi  = α + βXi i + _  Di  + εi          (12) 
 
in the second stage. If a suitable instrument exists, (11) and (12) will give an unbiased estimate of 
ATT. Failure to find a good instrument has often been the major drawback affecting reliability of IV 
estimates. Z qualifies to be a valid instrument if it affects the probability of receiving the DG, without 
itself being affected by any confounding factors that influence  probability of participating in the labour 
market-outcome variable (Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore, 
 




E (Z │εi) = 0            (14) 
 
A categorical variable, DIST, distance to the welfare office is used to instrument receipt of the DG.  
The dummy is coded 1 if an individual resides less than 30 minutes from public transport and 0 if 
otherwise. Table 5.4 presents the results (marginal effects) of a first stage probit regression of DG 
receipt on distance to welfare office  (instrument) and other various controls. The full set of first stage 
IV probit results are shown in Table 9 (see appendix). The results confirm that the instrument fulfils 
the first condition necessary to be a valid instrument: the marginal effect of being located closer to 
public transport significantly increases the likelihood of receiving the disability grant.  
 
Table 3: Sensitivity of disability grant take-up to distance to the nearest welfare office  
 Full sample Males Females 
 with disabilities with disabilities with disabilities 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
≤30 min to welfare office 0.085** 0.078** 0.091* 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.050) 
Other controls    
Individual Yes Yes Yes 
Household Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,398 1,254 1,144 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
However, the second condition (non-correlation with the residuals of the LFP equation) cannot be 
tested empirically, thus the choice of a valid instrument largely depends on intuition and economic 
theory. There are intuitive arguments making distance to nearest welfare office  an important predictor 
of receiving disability benefits. 
 
As Mitra (2005) notes, people with disabilities may not have access to disability programmes because 
of limited geographical access to welfare offices that provide information on eligibility, application 
procedures and the actual receipt of benefits and services. Physical accessibility is determined by the 
distance to the nearest welfare office  as well as access to public transport. 
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Similarly, van der Westhuizen and van Zyll (2002) identified accessibility of services, especially in 
rural areas as the major problem hindering the uptake of social programmes. Sparsely populated 
interior regions and bad roads were observed to be major obstacles to delivery of services. Transport 
costs are a major obstacle that deter poor people from travelling to departmental offices to apply for 
grants or to pay-points to collect grants. Provinces with sparsely populated areas struggle to reach 
grant recipients. It is against this background that DG take-up is instrumented with ‘distance to the 
nearest welfare office’ a categorical variable equal to 1 if an individual resides less than 30 minutes 
drive to the welfare office and 0 if otherwise. Distance to welfare office is expected to have an 
influence on LFP only via its effect on DG take-up. 
 
5.5 Results for Probit and Probit IV Regressions 
 
Table 5.5 reports extracts of probit and probit IV regressions results respectively. The full results for 
both specifications are reported in Tables 8 and 10 (see appendix). In both specifications, estimation 
is initially done for the full sample and then separately for males and females. The average effect of 
receiving disability benefits on LFP (ATT) was captured by DG dummy in a standard probit, whilst in 
probit IV, ATT was estimated using a two stage least squares regression. 
 
Using probit regressions, it is found that receipt of disability benefits reduces the probability of 
participating in the labour force by 22.3 percent for the full sample regression. When the sample is 
restricted to males only, the disincentive effect marginally declines to 21.6 percent, whilst restricting 
the sample to females yields a marginal effect slightly higher (23.3 percent) than in the other two 
cases. 
 
Table 4: Probit and Probit IV estimation results (marginal effects) of labour force participation, 
2007 
 
 Probit Probit IV 
 All Males Females All Males Females 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Disability Grant (ATT) -0.223*** -0.216*** -0.233*** -0.265*** -0.276** -0.298* 
 (0.023) (0.033) (0.031) (0.254) (0.327) (0.397) 
Other controls       
Individual Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Household Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Spatial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Disability severity Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 2,398 1,254 1,141 2,398 1,254 1,141 
 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Notes:  Robust standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
When DGP participation is instrumented with distance to nearest welfare office , the findings suggest 
that enrolled individuals are more likely to withdraw from the labour force than was reported in probit 
regressions. Specifically, the marginal effect of receiving disability benefits on the probability of 
withdrawing from the labour market is 26.5 percent for the full sample, more than four percent higher 
than reported in the standard probit regression. The effect is similarly higher for both males and 
females, although with reduced statistical significance for females. While our instrument passed the 
under-identification tests, the discrepancy in probit and probit IV results, although marginal, suggest 
that our instrument may have been weak. In particular we might be concerned that without adequate 
controls for urban/rural residence of DG applicants, distance to the welfare office may just be picking 
effects that otherwise would be picked by the urban/rural variable. Further, because employment 
opportunities are limited in rural areas, distance to welfare office may not only ifluence LFP via DG 
take-up, but may proxy the direct rural/urban effect on LFP. This adds credence to the idea that our 
instrument may be weak. The following section, thus, implements yet another estimation technique to 
check the robustness of the above results. 
 
5.6 Robustness Check: The Evaluation Problem 
 
The standard probit and probit IV techniques assume that DG effect is uniform across the distribution 
of covariates and is adequately captured by the coefficient of the DG dummy. Nonetheless, economic 
theory provides no justification for such a linear restriction which poses a major drawback. Therefore, 




the probit and IV analyses are complemented with a non-parametric propensity score matching 
approach following the works of Caliendo and Kopeinig (2008); Dehejia (2005); Dehejia and Wahba 
(2002); Smith and E Todd (2005); Heckman, Ichimura and Todd (1997); Rosenbaum and Rubin 
(1983); and Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983). 
 
Propensity score matching is implemented in two steps. Firstly, a probability model is estimated to 
calculate the probability (or propensity score) of receiving disability benefits for each observation. In 
the second step, each recipient is matched to a non-recipient with similar propensity score values, in 
order to estimate the average treatment effect for the treated (ATT). Various matching methods have 
been developed to match recipients with non-recipients of similar propensity scores. Asymptotically, 
all matching methods should yield similar results. However, in practice, there are trade-offs in terms of 
bias and efficiency with each method (Caliendo and Kopeinig, 2008). This study implements the 
nearest neighbour, radius, local linear regression, kernel, and stratification based matching 
algorithms. 
 
Following Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), the PSM approach considers a random sample n of 18 - 60 
year old individuals with disabilities drawn from a sample of size N where ni < N. N is, thus, the size of 
the admissible population. Each person within the sample is exposed to a binary treatment Di       {1, 0}; 
Di = 1, if the person is enrolled in the DGP (treated), and Di = 0 if the person does not receive disability 
benefits (control). Each participant in both the control and treated groups has a vector of pre-
treatment characteristics: 
 
Xi  = [Xi,1 , Xi,2 ; ... Xi,k]           (15) 
 
with k > 1 and i       {1, 2, ..., n}. The pre-treatment characteristics include vocational factors such as 
age, gender, marital status, household composition, provincial dummies as well as educational 
attainment levels. Let ɸX│D=1 and ɸX│D=2 represent the densities of these covariates in the treatment 
and control population respectively. Yi (Wi) is assumed to denote the pair of potential labour market 
participation outcomes that individual i attains if they are exposed to the treatment and vice-versa. 
The LFP status of each individual is thus: 
 
Yi = LFPi = Yi  (1) Di + (1 - Di) Yi (0)         (16) 
 
From (16) it is apparent that an individual cannot be observed in both states at the same time: that is 
both participating and not participating in the labour market.2 However, for each individual one can 
simultaneously observe D, Yi  and Xi  . For each unit, the unobserved treatment effect Ɵ is defined as: 
 




For the purposes of this study, the interest is in measuring the probability of LFP for people who have 
been treated. This has traditionally been de.ned as the Average Treatment Effect on the Treated 
(ATT): 
 
 Ɵ = E [Y (1) │D = 1] – E [Y (0) │D = 1]        (18) 
 
 identified counterfactual 
 
first part of (18) can be easily estimated fromthe data. The second part E [Y (0) │D = 1] is, however, 
not identified, as it is not possible to observe an individual receiving and not receiving the DG 
simultaneously. The only information available about Y (0) is in the admissible population not exposed 
to the treatment. Identification of this part entails using propensity score matching. The closer the 
propensity score, the better the match. It is crucial to ensure that the people who are selected into the 
control group are not sys- tematically different from the treated individuals, otherwise the identification 
process will be exposed to selection bias. Therefore, four crucial assumptions are required to ensure 
identification. 
                                                   
2 It is possible to observe an individual in either state if one is using longitudinal data and the treatment is only administered 
some time after observation of the sample had started. 
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5.6.2 Assumptions  
 
5.6.3 Conditional Independence Assumption 
 
The conditional independence assumption, 
 
Y (0)    D│X            (19) 
 
requires that conditioning on treatment, the potential outcomes of the treated and control groups are 
similar. This assumption is valid insofar as the unobservables are unrelated to the probability of 
receiving the DG once one has conditioned on the relevant observable individual attributes. That is, 
the set of X’s should contain all the variables that jointly influence LFP with no-treatment as well as 
the selection into treatment. Selection on unobservables is thus ignorable. 
 
5.6.4 Stable Unit Treatment Value Assumption 
 
It is further required that potential labour market participation outcome of an individual be unaffected 
by the particular assignment of treatment to other persons. This excludes interference of outcomes 




X = X (1) = X (0)           (20) 
 
Treatment should not have a causal impact on X, otherwise conditioning is partly on the effect. If 
violated, the average treatment effect Ɵ is still identified but can not be considered as causal. 
 
5.6.6 Common Support Condition 
 
0 < p(x) < 1,   x    X           (21) 
 
Expression (21) is the propensity score denoted: 
 
P (Disability Grant│X)    p(x)          (22) 
 
which is the probability that an individual with disabilities receives the DG conditional on the 
corresponding vector of covariates (X).3  
 
The propensity score provides a way of comparing those who are treated against those who are not 
treated in the sample. It is a measure of proximity between sample units that summarises all the 
information on the covariates set X into a single dimension vector so that comparison between units 
can be conducted on a probability level. When the propensity score is similar between a DG recipient 
and a non-recipient, the outcome of interest from the non-recipient individual can serve as the 
‘counterfactual’ outcome that the recipient would have had in the event of not receiving the disability 
grant. Once each recipient is matched to a non-recipient, the matching procedure goes on to compare 
average outcomes between recipients and non-recipients. 
 
5.7 Empirical Strategy 
 
5.8 Estimating Propensity Scores 
 
The empirical strategy to evaluate the effect of the disability benefits on LFP on matching methods. 
The key issue upon which validity of results rests is the choice of comparison units. The propensity 
scores are estimated first using a probit model. The dependent variable is the DG dummy. Table 5 
presents the results (marginal effects) of implementing a probit model on the determinants of 
                                                   
3 These are not the same Xs as would be selected when running a standard instrumental variables (IV) regression; in that case 
one would want Xs correlated with receipt of disability grant but not related with labour market status. 




receiving the DG. The estimates show that several variables are significantly associated with receipt 
of DG. Relative to Africans, Coloureds have a higher likelihood of receiving the DG, whilst Asians and 
Whites are less likely to receive the DG. Restricting the sample to males and females yields a 
statistically insignificant race effect on receipt of the DG. Age is positively related with DG receipt for 
both males and females: older individuals have a higher likelihood of receiving the DG than younger 
individuals (18-24 years).  
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Table 5: Sensitivity of disability grant receipt to vocational factors (marginal effects of a probit 
model) 
 All individuals with disabilities Males with disabilities Females with disabilities 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Coloured 0.065* 0.059 0.070 
 (0.040) (0.054) (0.061) 
Asian -0.032 0.023 -0.078 
 (0.091) (0.132) (0.127) 
White -0.059 -0.068 -0.052 
 (0.062) (0.083) (0.097) 
Male 0.019   
 (0.022)   
25-34 years 0.127*** 0.132*** 0.130** 
 (0.036) (0.046) (0.057) 
35-44 years 0.202*** 0.222*** 0.192*** 
 (0.034) (0.043) (0.055) 
45- 54 years 0.253*** 0.239*** 0.277*** 
 (0.035) (0.046) (0.055) 
55-60 years 0.198*** 0.201*** 0.210*** 
 (0.038) (0.050) (0.059) 
Married -0.053* -0.048 -0.060 
 (0.030) (0.044) (0.044) 
Cohabit -0.044 -0.020 -0.072 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.061) 
Widowed -0.010 -0.050 -0.004 
 (0.046) (0.088) (0.056) 
Divorced -0.042 -0.089 0.000 
 (0.055) (0.082) (0.075) 
Primary -0.085*** -0.087** -0.079** 
 (0.025) (0.035) (0.036) 
Secondary -0.070** -0.068 -0.065 
 (0.032) (0.045) (0.047) 
Diploma -0.436*** -0.302*** -0.565*** 
 (0.060) (0.107) (0.034) 
Degree -0.270* -0.320* -0.207 
 (0.150) (0.179) (0.291) 
Eastern Cape 0.222*** 0.161** 0.285*** 
 (0.043) (0.066) (0.056) 
Northern Cape 0.129** 0.091 0.171** 
 (0.056) (0.081) (0.080) 
Free State 0.173*** 0.154** 0.190*** 
 (0.048) (0.071) (0.067) 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.130*** 0.068 0.194*** 
 (0.048) (0.072) (0.065) 
North West 0.068 0.062 0.078 
 (0.052) (0.076) (0.074) 
Western Cape 0.223*** 0.202*** 0.243*** 
 (0.050) (0.072) (0.072) 
Mpumalanga 0.113** 0.001 0.221*** 
 (0.052) (0.083) (0.063) 
Limpopo 0.183*** 0.162** 0.192*** 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.070) 
Means-test -0.354*** -0.361*** -0.354*** 
 (0.034) (0.052) (0.046) 
Sight -0.215*** -0.219*** -0.218*** 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.050) 
Hearing -0.234*** -0.281*** -0.200*** 
 (0.039) (0.060) (0.053) 
Speech 0.057 0.044 0.060 
 (0.057) (0.078) (0.086) 
Mental 0.044 0.017 0.084* 
 (0.031) (0.040) (0.049) 
Emotional 0.080** 0.075 0.087* 
 (0.034) (0.048) (0.051) 
Household size 0.002 0.006 -0.003 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) 
District unemployment rate -0.008 0.056 -0.041 
 (0.149) (0.211) (0.217) 
30 min to welfare office 0.023** 0.013* 0.023 
 (0.024) (0.033) (0.035) 
30 min to public transport 0.062*** 0.052** 0.077* 
 (0.035) (0.048) (0.053) 
Observations 2,398 1,254 1,144 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 





Marital status and household size are not significant predictors of DG receipt for both males and 
females, whilst, as expected, there is an inverse association between educational attainment and 
receipt of DG. Relative to individuals with no formal education, individuals with post-primary education 
are less likely to receive the DG. The effect appears to increase with each successive educational 
cohort for both males and females. Barring the North West province, all other provinces have a higher 
probability of having DG recipients compared to Gauteng. Individuals with emotional disabilities are 
more likely to receive the DG relative to individuals with physical disabilities, whereas individuals with  
sight and hearing disabilities are less likely to receive the DG compared with individuals with physical 
disabilities. Finally, the closer an individual resides to the welfare office, and public transport, the 
higher the probability of receiving disability benefits. 
 
5.9 Common Support Check 
 
Before estimating the causal effects of the DG on labour supply, it is essential to check the region of 
common support and determine if there is enough overlap between the treated and control cases. 
Figure 5, a histogram of the estimated propensity scores, provides a simple diagnostic on the data. A 
visual inspection of the density of distributions of the estimated propensity scores of recipients and 
non- recipients shows that the common support condition is satisfied.  
 
Figure 5: Histogram of estimated propensity scores 
 
Note: ‘Treated: on support’ indicates the observations in the treated group that have a suitable comparison, while ‘Treated: 
off support’ indicates the observations in the treated group that do not have a suitable comparison. 
 
The upper half (in red) shows the treated cases, while the control cases in blue are graphed in the 
lower half. Treated cases are restricted within propensity scores of 0.1 and 0.9 whilst control cases 
span the whole range of the propensity score, but above 0.9. Both treated and control cases are 
concentrated above propensity scores of 0.5. It thus appears there is no common support problem. 
 
5.10  Covariate Balance Checking 
 
Propensity score methodology relies on balancing the observed distribution of covariates across DG 
recipients and non-recipients (Lee, 2006). The balancing test is implemented after matching to check 
if differences in the covariates observed between DG recipients and non-recipients before matching 
were eliminated by matching. If no differences are observed after matching, the DG non-recipients are 
Disability Grant and Individual Labour Force 
Participation: The Case of South Africa 
21 
 
considered a plausible counterfactual. Of the several balancing tests explored in the literature, the 
mean absolute standardized bias (MASB) is the most widely used (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1985). A 
standardized difference of greater than 20 per cent should be considered too large and an indicator 
that the matching process has failed (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983). If an affirmative result is 
achieved, the propensity score method becomes a reliable alternative to randomized clinical trials in 
terms of the bias introduced by using non-experimental data. 
 
Table 6 presents balance check results before and after matching. Each row shows the mean of a 
variable for both treated and control groups. Further, the percentage bias (standardised difference 
between the mean of treated and control groups for the same variable) is also shown. An additional 
column for the percentage reduction in bias (how much of the bias was eliminated by matching), is 
included for the matched cases. Balance is achieved if the p-value for the difference in treated and 
control means is not statistically significant for all variables. The results show that a number of 
variables failed the balance test pre-matching, though all the bias was eliminated through matching. 
 
  




Table 6: Balancing tests on all covariates before and after matching with propensity scores 
 Unmatched Matched 










Variable Treated Control   Treated Control    
Race          
African 0.766 0.794 -6.6 0.039 0.77 0.79 -3.9 40.8 0.139 
Coloured 0.185 0.134 13.9 0.000 0.186 0.188 -0.4 97.2 0.923 
Asian 0.016 0.017 -1.4 0.659 0.013 0.021 -6.7 -366.9 0.081 
White 0.033 0.054 -10.5 0.001 0.030 0.029 0.3 96.7 0.911 
Gender          
Male 0.555 0.465 18.1 0.000 0.534 0.515 3.8 78.8 0.309 
Female 0.445 0.535 -18.1 0.000 0.465 0.484 -3.8 78.8 0.309 
Age groups          
18-24 years 0.095 0.167 -21.3 0.000 0.092 0.076 4.8 77.3 0.119 
25-34 years  0.176 0.194 -4.7 0.247 0.174 0.171 0.7 84.5 0.842 
35-44 years 0.255 0.233 5.1 0.212 0.254 0.251 0.8 83.9 0.829 
45-54 years 0.308 0.248 13.4 0.001 0.311 0.302 2.1 84.6 0.596 
55-60 years 0.166 0.158 2.1 0.600 0.169 0.179 -2.7 -25.3 0.487 
Marital Status          
Single 0.572 0.455 23.5 0.000 0.556 0.530 5.3 77.5 0.163 
Married 0.230 0.256 -6.3 0.053 0.230 0.235 -1.2 81.6 0.755 
Cohabit 0.073 0.057 6.7 0.038 0.079 0.069 3.7 43.8 0.350 
Widowed 0.083 0.193 -32.2 0.000 0.088 0.091 -1.0 96.8 0.742 
Divorced 0.042 0.039 1.9 0.560 0.047 0.053 -2.9 -53.1 0.491 
Educational Attainment          
No education 0.302 0.309 -1.4 0.657 0.277 0.311 -7.4 -409.4 0.148 
Primary 0.471 0.474 -0.6 0.862 0.474 0.464 2.0 -250.4 0.598 
Secondary 0.164 0.131 9.3 0.004 0.179 0.186 -2.0 78.4 0.626 
Matric 0.055 0.055 -0.2 0.942 0.062 0.054 3.4 -1333.5 0.375 
Diploma 0.005 0.023 -14.5 0.000 0.006 0.006 0.6 95.8 0.808 
Degree 0.002 0.008 -7.8 0.021 0.003 0.005 -2.9 62.5 0.365 
Literacy          
Can read 0.600 0.563 7.5 0.021 0.627 0.612 3.0 59.6 0.416 
Can write 0.593 0.561 6.5 0.043 0.621 0.608 2.6 60.6 0.487 
Province          
Gauteng 0.044 0.079 -14.6 0.000 0.096 0.038 0.6 96.0 0.846 
Eastern Cape 0.179 0.131 13.2 0.000 0.180 0.168 3.3 74.8 0.399 
Northern Cape 0.073 0.085 -4.4 0.172 0.076 0.071 1.8 58.6 0.613 
Free State 0.085 0.092 -2.4 0.466 0.089 0.077 4.0 -69.0 0.275 
KwaZulu Natal 0.257 0.250 1.4 0.655 0.247 0.259 -2.9 -103.4 0.436 
North West 0.093 0.120 -9.0 0.006 0.096 0.111 -4.6 48.6 0.217 
Western Cape 0.117 0.078 13.2 0.000 0.117 0.123 -1.9 85.5 0.643 
Mpumalanga 0.072 0.098 -9.2 0.005 0.078 0.073 1.8 80.6 0.618 
Limpopo 0.079 0.066 5.2 0.103 0.078 0.084 -2.5 53.0 0.535 
Child status          
No children 0.333 0.338 -1.1 0.731 0.351 0.385 -7.3 -561.8 0.113 
Infants present 0.084 0.081 0.8 0.806 0.082 0.101 -7.0 -779.2 0.078 
Children 1-7 years present 0.380 0.388 -1.6 0.628 0.369 0.335 7.0 -347.5 0.059 
Children 8-15 years present 0.202 0.192 2.7 0.406 0.198 0.199 -0.4 86.7 0.925 
Pensioner          
Over 60 year old present 0.338 0.512 -35.7 0.000 0.291 0.285 1.2 96.7 0.740 
Local Labour mkt 
conditions 
         
District unemployment rate 0.250 0.247 4.0 0.216 0.249 0.247 2.5 38.1 0.528 
District narrow LFP 0.519 0.522 -2.8 0.382 0.517 0.517 0.6 80.3 0.881 
Disability          
Physical 0.485 0.389 19.5 0.000 0.500 0.533 -6.7 65.6 0.107 
Sight 0.075 0.223 -42.6 0.000 0.076 0.068 2.2 94.7 0.423 
Hearing 0.053 0.173 -38.5 0.000 0.052 0.050 0.7 98.2 0.798 
Speech 0.042 0.025 9.1 0.005 0.038 0.040 -0.8 91.3 0.846 
Mental 0.214 0.118 26.2 0.000 0.200 0.172 7.7 70.6 0.053 
Emotional 0.130 0.072 19.6 0.000 0.133 0.144 -3.8 80.7 0.383 
Distance to welfare office          
Less than 30 min 0.896 0.869 8.4 0.110 0.896 0.869 8.2 -7.5 0.110 
More than 30 min 0.104 0.104 8.3 0.112 0.104 0.104 8.3 -7.3 0.112 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007 
 
5.11 Results from Matching 
 
Table 7 reports the estimates of the average labour supply effects of DG receipt estimated by nearest 
neighbour, radius, local linear regression, kernel and stratification matching algorithms. As a 
sensitivity analysis, the radius matching is implemented at three caliper sizes of 0.01, 0.02, and 0.05. 
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All the analyses were based on implementation of common support, so that the distribution of DG 
recipients and non-recipients were located in the same domain. Bootstrap standard errors based on 
400 replications are also reported.  
 
Table 7: Average Treatment Effects Results 
Matching Method Bandwidth Caliper ATT Standard Error Observations 
     Treated Controls 
Nearest Neighbour   -0.213*** (0.026) 1418 563 
Radius Matching  r=0.05 -0.200*** (0.018) 1418 965 
  r=0.02 -0.197*** (0.018) 1415 965 
  r=0.01 -0.197*** (0.020) 1414 963 
Local Linear Regression b=0:18  -0.194*** (0.015) 1411 965 
Kernel b=0:14  -0.197*** (0.016) 1418 965 
Stratification   -0.192*** (0.017) 1418 965 
Nearest Neighbour   -0.184*** (0.038) 759 292 
Males 
Radius Matching  r=0.05 -0.196*** (0.028) 753 477 
  r=0.02 -0.194*** (0.027) 759 483 
  r=0.01 -0.198*** (0.028) 759 483 
Local Linear Regression b=0:18  -0.196*** (0.020) 757 483 
Kernel b=0:14  -0.197*** (0.026) 759 483 
Stratification   -0.193*** (0.025) 759 483 
Females 
Nearest Neighbour   -0.176*** (0.037) 659 263 
Radius Matching  r=0.05 -0.199*** (0.028) 655 467 
  r=0.02 -0.195*** (0.027) 658 473 
  r=0.01 -0.192*** (0.027) 659 474 
Local Linear Regression b=0:18  -0.193*** (0.022) 656 474 
Kernel b=0:14  -0.187*** (0.029) 659 474 
Stratification   -0.190*** (0.026) 659 474 
Source:  Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
The outcome variable is narrow LFP. In order to further understand the labour supply impact of DG 
receipt on different recipients, the differential impact is examined by dividing the sample into males 
and females. In each subset of the sample, the first row shows the results from nearest neighbour 
matching algorithm. The next three rows report the results from radius matching, with radii of 0.01, 
0.02 and 0.05. Local linear regression and kernel based matching results are shown in the last two 
rows.  
 
In all cases the results indicate that receipt of DG has a negative and significant effect on the 
probability of participating in the labour market. The decline in probability of LFP ranges from 19.2 to 
21.3 percent for the full sample, 18.4 to 19.8 percent for males, and 17.6 to 19.9 percent for females. 
This is the average difference in probabilities of participating in the labour force for similar individuals 
that belong to different DG status (i.e. recipients and non-recipients). These results are consistent 




This paper investigated the impact of disability receipts on LFP in South Africa. The study utilised data 
from the 2007 wave of the GHS. The effect of disability benefits on LFP was estimated using a 
standard probit and probit IV regressions to control for observable variables and possible endogeneity 
of DGP participation. A variety of propensity score matching techniques were implemented to assess 
the robustness of the results. This helped in estimating the true effect of labour supply effect of 
disability benefits by controlling for the role of selection on enrolment to the DGP. Individuals with 
disabilities who receive disability benefits served as the treated group, while individuals with 
disabilities but not receiving disability benefits were the control cases. 
 
Two main conclusions can be drawn from these results. Firstly, all of the results suggest that the DGP 
appears to have altered the labour market behaviour of working age individuals. The standard probit 
and PSM results suggest that individuals receiving disability benefits would have their probability of 
participating in the labour force increase by between 19.2 and 22.3 percent had they not been 




receiving the grant, whilst the effect is larger for the IV regression. These results confirm a commonly 
held view among observers that the DGP promotes dependency by reducing labour supply.  
 
However, one cannot completely ascertain the true labour supply effect of the DGP. A major concern 
arises from the inadequacy of the available data to control for the severity of disability of beneficiaries. 
Should there be differences in disability severity (health effect) between DG recipients and non-
recipients, the effect of the DG on labour supply would be contaminated. Thus in as much as it is 
undisputable that the DGP does have some work disincentive effect, it is impossible to differentiate 
the reservation wage effect and the health effect from the observed overall effect. 
 
Nonetheless, since inclusion and exclusion errors in disability tagging equally affect both the treated 
and control groups, it may not be entirely incorrect to assume that eligibility to the DGP satis.es the 
principles of randomisation. In this case the estimated coefficients in the paper will represent the true 
labour supply effects of the DGP. This may prove useful given some of the concerns among policy 
makers especially with regards to ensuring that people with disabilities are rehabilitated and 
eventually return to useful employment. Specifically, efforts to administer the DGP efficiently and 
effectively should focus on inventing a more systematic evaluation of potential DGP applicants, which 
would reduce the possibility of inclusion and exclusion errors. 
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Table 8: Probit estimates (marginal e¤ects) of labour force participation, 2007 
 

























 (0.010) (0.022) (0.022) (0.014) (0.022) (0.021) (0.013) (0.029) (0.028) 
Coloured  0.028 0.017  0.010 0.006  0.008 0.006 
  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.021)  (0.043) (0.045) 
Asian  0.049 0.059  0.010 0.020  0.088*** 0.076*** 
  (0.046) (0.042)  (0.040) (0.034)  (0.016) (0.018) 
White  0.022 0.005  0.002 0.009  0.049 0.041 
  (0.035) (0.040)  (0.030) (0.034)  (0.031) (0.033) 
25-34 years  0.020 0.026  -0.010 -0.011  0.081 0.103* 
  (0.030) (0.031)  (0.020) (0.018)  (0.054) (0.058) 
35-44 years  -0.030 -0.026  -0.021 -0.021  0.002 0.013 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.018) (0.017)  (0.042) (0.042) 
45-54 years  -0.056** -0.045*  -0.025 -0.020  -0.049 -0.026 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.019)  (0.039) (0.040) 
55-60 years  -0.063** -0.064**  -0.038** -0.040***  -0.018 -0.004 
  (0.027) (0.025)  (0.017) (0.014)  (0.046) (0.047) 
Married  0.109*** 0.079***  0.075** 0.049*  0.103** 0.080** 
  (0.031) (0.029)  (0.030) (0.027)  (0.042) (0.039) 
Cohabit  0.075* 0.048  0.061 0.038  0.029 0.014 
  (0.041) (0.038)  (0.041) (0.034)  (0.049) (0.043) 
Widowed  0.051 0.029  0.071 0.047  0.027 0.022 
  (0.052) (0.048)  (0.069) (0.059)  (0.057) (0.055) 
Divorced  0.105* 0.095  0.126 0.111  0.029 0.021 
  (0.062) (0.060)  (0.077) (0.072)  (0.065) (0.060) 
Primary  0.071*** 0.065**  0.037* 0.031  0.063 0.064* 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.020) (0.019)  (0.039) (0.038) 
Secondary  0.134*** 0.107***  0.044 0.027  0.196*** 0.191*** 
  (0.042) (0.041)  (0.031) (0.027)  (0.070) (0.074) 
Matric  0.308*** 0.272***  0.134** 0.105*  0.375*** 0.370*** 
  (0.067) (0.068)  (0.061) (0.056)  (0.112) (0.120) 
Diploma  0.528*** 0.490***  0.403*** 0.318**  0.644*** 0.668*** 
  (0.094) (0.102)  (0.135) (0.135)  (0.132) (0.135) 
Degree  0.516*** 0.395**  0.409* 0.309  0.648**  
  (0.163) (0.183)  (0.214) (0.202)  (0.275)  
Eastern Cape  -0.047 -0.039  -0.036* -0.027  -0.054 -0.054* 
  (0.033) (0.034)  (0.022) (0.023)  (0.036) (0.032) 
Northern Cape  0.048 0.021  0.036 0.018  -0.025 -0.037 
  (0.055) (0.049)  (0.050) (0.042)  (0.050) (0.040) 
Free  State  -0.031 -0.025  -0.054*** -0.047***  0.045 0.044 
  (0.035) (0.036)  (0.012) (0.012)  (0.061) (0.061) 
KwaZulu-Natal  -0.003 -0.003  -0.010 -0.009  -0.021 -0.022 
  (0.039) (0.039)  (0.031) (0.029)  (0.045) (0.042) 
North West  -0.036 -0.035  -0.024 -0.020  -0.034 -0.034 
  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.024) (0.023)  (0.038) (0.035) 
Western Cape  -0.036 -0.032  -0.013 -0.009  -0.054 -0.048 
  (0.038) (0.038)  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.035) (0.033) 
Mpumalanga  -0.035 -0.031  -0.009 -0.004  -0.064** -0.059** 
  (0.033) (0.033)  (0.029) (0.030)  (0.027) (0.025) 
Limpopo  -0.076** -0.081***  -0.040** -0.038**  -0.074** -0.076*** 
  (0.030) (0.026)  (0.020) (0.017)  (0.029) (0.022) 
Means-test  0.942*** 0.946***     0.960*** 0.968*** 
  (0.008) (0.008)     (0.010) (0.009) 
Infants present  -0.029 -0.021  -0.020 -0.006  -0.004 0.006 
  (0.028) (0.029)  (0.022) (0.025)  (0.040) (0.042) 
Children 1-7 present  -0.004 0.002  -0.003 0.000  0.006 0.021 
  (0.020) (0.020)  (0.015) (0.015)  (0.029) (0.029) 
Children 8-15present  0.021 0.026  0.017 0.021  0.019 0.027 
  (0.026) (0.026)  (0.021) (0.021)  (0.036) (0.037) 
Pensioner present  0.008 0.013  0.012 0.016  0.003 0.010 
  (0.021) (0.020)  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.026) (0.026) 
Local unemployment 
rate 
 0.099 0.095  0.207** 0.177**  -0.171 -0.122 
  (0.113) (0.111)  (0.088) (0.084)  (0.149) (0.141) 
Local LFPR  0.179* 0.121  0.079 0.052  0.123 0.045 
  (0.106) (0.105)  (0.080) (0.075)  (0.144) (0.138) 
…continued          
Disability Grant and Individual Labour Force 
Participation: The Case of South Africa 
31 
 
...continued          






Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Sight   0.128***   0.073**   0.125** 
   (0.036)   (0.033)   (0.053) 
Hearing   0.108***   0.035   0.161*** 
   (0.039)   (0.032)   (0.059) 
Speech   0.130**   0.058   0.180* 
   (0.065)   (0.052)   (0.106) 
Mental   -0.068***   -0.037***   -0.054* 
   (0.020)   (0.013)   (0.028) 
Emotional   -0.018   -0.024   0.042 
   (0.028)   (0.016)   (0.047) 
Observations 3,923 2,435 2,398 1,975 1,167 1,147 1,947 1,161 1,141 
 
Source:  Author's calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
  




Table 9: First stage - Distance to the nearest welfare office as a predictor of disability grant 
receipt (marginal effects of probit estimates) 
 Full sample with disabilities Males with disabilities Females with disabilities 
Variables  (1) (2) (3) 
Coloured 0.075* 0.072 0.073 
 (0.039) (0.053) (0.060) 
Asian -0.031 0.058 -0.085 
 (0.091) (0.130) (0.123) 
White 0.011 0.029 -0.025 
 (0.062) (0.081) (0.098) 
25-34 years 0.107*** 0.110** 0.112* 
 (0.037) (0.048) (0.058) 
35-44 years 0.169*** 0.193*** 0.153*** 
 (0.035) (0.045) (0.057) 
45-54 years 0.216*** 0.220*** 0.215*** 
 (0.036) (0.047) (0.058) 
55-60 years 0.172*** 0.193*** 0.163*** 
 (0.040) (0.051) (0.063) 
Married -0.048 -0.053 -0.047 
 (0.031) (0.045) (0.043) 
Cohabit -0.037 -0.028 -0.056 
 (0.041) (0.057) (0.061) 
Widowed -0.006 -0.042 0.022 
 (0.045) (0.088) (0.055) 
Divorced -0.058 -0.110 -0.000 
 (0.054) (0.080) (0.074) 
Primary -0.115*** -0.128*** -0.103*** 
 (0.027) (0.038) (0.039) 
Secondary -0.105*** -0.107** -0.100** 
 (0.035) (0.049) (0.051) 
Matric -0.136*** -0.162** -0.119 
 (0.048) (0.065) (0.074) 
Diploma -0.436*** -0.307*** -0.566*** 
 (0.061) (0.110) (0.035) 
Degree -0.292** -0.354** -0.194 
 (0.142) (0.165) (0.287) 
Eastern Cape 0.232*** 0.168** 0.291*** 
 (0.046) (0.072) (0.060) 
Northern Cape 0.119** 0.078 0.159* 
 (0.057) (0.084) (0.082) 
Free State 0.174*** 0.158** 0.185*** 
 (0.049) (0.071) (0.069) 
KwaZulu-Natal 0.139*** 0.084 0.187*** 
 (0.052) (0.078) (0.072) 
North West 0.085 0.081 0.090 
 (0.056) (0.081) (0.080) 
Western Cape 0.232*** 0.204*** 0.256*** 
 (0.048) (0.071) (0.069) 
Mpumalanga 0.104** -0.007 0.212*** 
 (0.053) (0.084) (0.065) 
Limpopo 0.205*** 0.189** 0.204*** 
 (0.053) (0.076) (0.079) 
Infants present -0.029 -0.010 -0.060 
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.057) 
Children 1-7 years present -0.009 0.043 -0.075* 
 (0.026) (0.034) (0.040) 
Children 8-15 years present 0.025 0.032 -0.001 
 (0.031) (0.042) (0.047) 
Pensioner present 0.080*** 0.097*** 0.073** 
 (0.024) (0.035) (0.036) 
Local unemployment rate 0.078 0.140 0.081 
 (0.148) (0.211) (0.214) 
Local LFPR 0.072 0.027 0.102 
 (0.132) (0.181) (0.198) 
Sight -0.250*** -0.260*** -0.255*** 
 (0.033) (0.047) (0.047) 
Hearing -0.256*** -0.333*** -0.192*** 
 (0.038) (0.055) (0.053) 
Speech 0.041 0.021 0.044 
 (0.057) (0.079) (0.087) 
Mental 0.046 0.012 0.080* 
 (0.030) (0.040) (0.049) 
Emotional 0.073** 0.060 0.091* 
 (0.034) (0.048) (0.050) 
30 min to p/transport 0.085** 0.078* 0.091* 
 (0.033) (0.046) (0.050) 
Observations 2,398 1,254 1,144 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007. 
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Second-stage probit IV estimates (marginal effects) of labour force participation, 
2007 
 
 All observations with disabilities Males with disabilities Females with disabilities 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Disability Grant -0.394*** -0.303*** -0.265*** -0.314*** -0.292*** -0.276*** -0.338*** -0.313*** 0.298*** 
 (0.041) (0.062) (0.254) (0.056) (0.087) (0.327) (0.060) (0.089) (0.397) 
Coloured  0.010 0.037  0.005 0.011  0.019 0.056 
  (0.029) (0.029)  (0.040) (0.042)  (0.043) (0.041) 
Asian  0.067 0.055  0.074 0.066  0.079 0.063 
  (0.044) (0.047)  (0.054) (0.056)  (0.055) (0.063) 
White  0.070** 0.064**  0.055 0.047  0.102*** 0.096*** 
  (0.028) (0.029)  (0.041) (0.042)  (0.032) (0.033) 
25-34 years  0.122*** 0.058  0.082* 0.034  0.189*** 0.101 
  (0.037) (0.045)  (0.046) (0.054)  (0.066) (0.078) 
35-44 years  0.117*** 0.027  0.086* 0.022  0.175*** 0.047 
  (0.037) (0.052)  (0.046) (0.066)  (0.064) (0.087) 
45-54 years  0.119*** 0.005  0.076 -0.006  0.197*** 0.036 
  (0.039) (0.061)  (0.050) (0.077)  (0.065) (0.101) 
55-60 years  0.041 -0.044  -0.011 -0.065  0.125* -0.005 
  (0.039) (0.046)  (0.045) (0.052)  (0.071) (0.084) 
Married  0.071*** 0.085***  0.119*** 0.125***  0.035 0.061 
  (0.024) (0.028)  (0.039) (0.043)  (0.031) (0.038) 
Cohabit  0.041 0.051  0.093* 0.095*  -0.012 0.007 
  (0.031) (0.034)  (0.049) (0.051)  (0.038) (0.044) 
Widowed  0.032 0.030  0.082 0.071  -0.001 0.003 
  (0.037) (0.036)  (0.081) (0.077)  (0.040) (0.041) 
Divorced  0.102** 0.130**  0.185** 0.204**  0.045 0.089 
  (0.047) (0.053)  (0.080) (0.086)  (0.057) (0.069) 
Primary  -0.012 0.033  -0.016 0.014  -0.006 0.057 
  (0.022) (0.034)  (0.031) (0.045)  (0.032) (0.051) 
Secondary  0.005 0.046  -0.039 -0.016  0.063 0.131** 
  (0.027) (0.039)  (0.032) (0.044)  (0.043) (0.067) 
Matric  0.094** 0.162**  0.025 0.059  0.186** 0.300*** 
  (0.043) (0.066)  (0.049) (0.072)  (0.073) (0.111) 
Diploma  -0.010 0.230  -0.076* 0.019  0.097 0.534* 
  (0.056) (0.199)  (0.045) (0.165)  (0.116) (0.301) 
Degree  0.058 0.212  0.038 0.130    
  (0.116) (0.183)  (0.127) (0.198)    
Eastern Cape  0.082 -0.030  0.133* 0.036  -0.006 -0.111* 
  (0.052) (0.064)  (0.079) (0.107)  (0.061) (0.061) 
Northern Cape  0.112** 0.040  0.137* 0.072  0.052 -0.020 
  (0.056) (0.057)  (0.082) (0.085)  (0.075) (0.070) 
Free state  0.099* 0.002  0.014 -0.040  0.159** 0.019 
  (0.053) (0.059)  (0.063) (0.067)  (0.079) (0.092) 
KwaZulu-Natal  0.066 -0.001  0.069 0.017  0.047 -0.030 
  (0.043) (0.050)  (0.063) (0.072)  (0.059) (0.067) 
North West  -0.002 -0.036  -0.018 -0.046  -0.007 -0.041 
  (0.039) (0.037)  (0.053) (0.048)  (0.053) (0.051) 
Western Cape  0.093 -0.030  0.153 0.037  0.028 -0.087 
  (0.059) (0.065)  (0.093) (0.112)  (0.072) (0.069) 
Mpumalanga  0.041 -0.008  0.081 0.034  -0.004 -0.053 
  (0.043) (0.043)  (0.069) (0.071)  (0.052) (0.051) 
Limpopo  0.003 -0.080*  0.005 -0.062  -0.001 -0.098* 
  (0.052) (0.045)  (0.073) (0.067)  (0.072) (0.058) 
Infants present  -0.075*** -0.066***  -0.043 -0.036  -0.093*** -0.083*** 
  (0.021) (0.022)  (0.036) (0.037)  (0.027) (0.029) 
Children 1-7 years  -0.035** -0.030*  -0.050** -0.048**  -0.025 -0.017 
  (0.017) (0.017)  (0.023) (0.022)  (0.026) (0.027) 
Children 8-15 years  -0.004 -0.013  -0.006 -0.012  -0.002 -0.016 
  (0.021) (0.022)  (0.030) (0.029)  (0.031) (0.032) 
Pensioner present  -0.003 -0.034  0.000 -0.021  0.003 -0.042 
  (0.020) (0.024)  (0.029) (0.035)  (0.028) (0.036) 
Local unemployment  -0.082 -0.119  0.153 0.111  -0.338** -0.365** 
  (0.106) (0.105)  (0.145) (0.143)  (0.156) (0.156) 
Local LFPR  0.201** 0.141  0.261** 0.198  0.104 0.044 
  (0.096) (0.098)  (0.130) (0.132)  (0.143) (0.146) 
Sight   0.159*   0.096   0.250 
   (0.092)   (0.110)   (0.157) 
Hearing   0.109   0.086   0.155 
   (0.091)   (0.118)   (0.150) 
Speech   0.108**   0.110   0.099 
   (0.054)   (0.075)   (0.080) 
Mental   -0.085***   -0.087***   -0.070** 
   (0.020)   (0.026)   (0.033) 
Emotional   -0.003   0.021   -0.028 
   (0.030)   (0.044)   (0.042) 
Observations 2,398 2,398 2,398 1,254 1,254 1,254 1,144 1,141 1,141 
Source: Author’s calculations based on GHS, 2007.  
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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